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Fragmented Method:  
Walter Benjamin, Law, and Representation in 
Joseph S. Jenkins’ Inheritance Law and 
Political Theology in Shakespeare and Milton: 
Election and Grace as Constitutional in Early 
Modern Literature and Beyond  
 
Matthew Nicholson1  
Abstract: This review article considers the place of Walter Benjamin's thought in Joseph S. 
Jenkins' recent book and offers some broad reflections on the possibilities of Benjaminian legal 
scholarship. 
 
Scholarship on Walter Benjamin and law – on the significance of Benjamin’s thinking for 
the ontology of law, legal method, and the nature of legal scholarship – is a growth 
industry, a crowded marketplace.2 The challenge for this industry is, it seems to me, to 
create a ‘dialectical image’, a ‘flash’ of light, capable of transforming legal thought, 
breaking the link between law, inequality, and injustice by moving law into a closer 
relationship with their dialectical opposites.3 Whatever the debates about the phases in 
Benjamin’s thought – the ‘early’, the ‘late’, the Marxist, the religious – any attempt to 
constellate the fragments of Benjamin’s thought to say something about law as an 
intellectual field must,4 to my mind, be judged by its compatibility with his pursuit of 
radical transformation in the structure and method of thought and practice itself.  
Into this marketplace enters Joseph S. Jenkins’ book.5 I am interested, for the purposes 
of this piece, in the method by which this book has been written and the book’s impact 
on the method of legal scholarship, not its impact on inheritance or property law. The 
book is structured into an introduction, three parts each with two chapters, four ‘inter-
chapter theory signposts’ which review or preview the intellectual foundations of the 
preceding or following chapters, and an epilogue. This fragmented structure of chapters 
which explore particular texts – Hamlet, Macbeth, Paradise Lost – and ‘inter-chapter 
theory signposts’ which situate that exploration in the work of a variety of thinkers from 
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Arendt to Machiavelli is, perhaps, fitting in a book which asserts the Benjaminian 
character of its method.6 In my view, however, the fragmented method which Jenkins 
employs means that the book is unable to clearly represent the change in law and legal 
practice which Jenkins seems to want to bring about. That failure of representation, that 
failure to constellate the fragments which form the book into a ‘mosaic’ which the reader 
can admire, interrogate, and engage with as an ‘onlooker’,7 an active reader, searching 
out the significance and meaning of the text presented to her, represents a failure to 
realise the potential of Benjaminian legal scholarship.  
Ultimately, therefore, this book fails to satisfy the test, set out above, for Benjaminian 
legal scholarship; the ability to create a ‘dialectical image’ capable of transforming legal 
thought. The way in which this book fails to satisfy that test, the fact that the failure can 
be attributed to the structure of the book and its style of argumentation, says something 
instructive about what is at stake in Benjaminian legal scholarship and, more broadly, in 
scholarship which attempts to change law and legal thinking by working at the interface 
between law and the humanities. If Benjaminian legal scholarship and practice involves 
the production of ‘artifact[s]’,8 whether books, articles, or judgments, this cannot be 
achieved through a fragmented method or structure. The author must not ‘say’ what she 
wants the reader to understand or know, for fear of constraining the reader’s thoughts 
and depriving her of her freedom as a self-determining ‘onlooker’, ‘a writer…a describer, 
or even a prescriber’.9 But the Benjaminian author has an obligation to ‘show’,10 to 
represent, which cannot be fulfilled if the fragments which form the mosaic, the artifact, 
are left in a fragmented state.  
The challenge of Benjaminian legal scholarship is to disclaim the power of saying to the 
reader what the text you have authored means and how it should be understood or 
known, whilst showing the reader what emerges from the mosaic of fragments – texts, 
cases, and ideas – you have created.11 Jenkins fails this test in my view, not because he 
tells the reader what to think but because he fails to show the reader how the book’s 
various philosophical, legal, and literary fragments come together.  
 
Representing Jenkins and Benjamin 
Jenkins strives to make a general argument about the connection between law and the 
humanities through a narrow argument about the nature of inheritance law. The potential 
significance of this project is immense and it points to potentially fruitful avenues for 
future scholarship. If successful it would deconstruct the (perceived) divide between 
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theory and practice by connecting an area of legal practice – inheritance law – with 
literary texts – a number of Shakespeare’s plays and Milton’s Paradise Lost – which 
orthodox understandings of legal scholarship and practice regard as non-legal. Through 
this connection the narrow argument about inheritance law would demonstrate the case 
for an interdisciplinary legal scholarship which deconstructs law’s boundaries, law’s 
habits, customs, and limits which divide texts, concepts, and phenomena into legal and 
non-legal materials, with only the former the legitimate concern of legal argument and 
scholarship. The transformation in legal thought and practice which this project promises 
is without doubt compatible with Benjamin’s ambition to transform thought and practice 
but everything depends on its execution.  
The book begins with this statement: ‘This study investigates correlations between the 
will of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition and the Last Wills of humans, especially 
dominant males, in cultures where that tradition has developed.’12 The book’s epilogue 
opens with this statement:  
 
This epilogue relates the present study to the question of the private property right, 
including its inheritability, in the United States. U.S. legal academics, including the 
colleagues with whom they tend to work – in political science, philosophy, and 
economics, come at this question with an interest in history, but a history of a very 
different kind from the one elaborated in this book. One aim of this study is to 
contribute to the current question of private property by appealing to a history that 
works with different texts (notably Shakespeare and Milton), with the aid of 
different historiographical methodologies. Since these are texts and methodologies 
most tended to by humanities academics, this study aims also to demonstrate a 
contribution at the inter-discipline of law-and-humanities.13  
 
These two statements, from either end of the book, do not seem to complement one 
another, raising questions as to the coherence of the artifact. The first focuses on the 
interface between a particular religious tradition and the concept of the last will, whilst 
the second is concerned with ‘the current question of private property’, treating ‘its 
inheritability’, the apparent focus of the book’s opening passage, as one aspect of that 
broader issue.  
A further disconnect is apparent in the structure of chapter and ‘inter-chapter theory 
signpost’. Jenkins describes the purpose of the latter as ‘to give, from time to time, aerial 
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views of this study’s structure’.14 It is difficult to understand why a series of sections 
which ask the reader to step back from the substantive argument and consider its 
structure and method are necessary. It is surely preferable for the structure to support 
the argument being advanced without the reader having to reflect, by reading an ‘inter-
chapter theory signpost’, on the structure and method as something distinct from the 
argument.  
Beyond this point on structure, however, is the more fundamental point that Jenkins’ text, 
and his inter-chapter sections in particular, fail to engage in detail with the work of the 
thinkers it references. In the first inter-chapter section Jenkins states:  
 
Indebted to Walter Benjamin and others, this study hypothesizes as follows: that 
originary moments exert – through language transmissions and related effects on 
human bodies – valences (“gravitational pulls”) sufficient to affect conventions of 
meaning (cultural conventions as to what is real, natural, and/or true), even for 
cultural moments distant in space and time.15  
 
Jenkins does not tie this reference to Benjamin to any of Benjamin’s texts. The casual 
nature of the reference to ‘Benjamin and others’ also invites the obvious question ‘which 
others, and how is their work connected to Benjamin’s?’ Jenkins defends his failure to 
consider the work of the thinkers he refers to in the main text on the basis that ‘[i]ssues 
of concern to specialists are treated in extended footnotes. By placing these more 
intricate passages “below the line,” the book aims to keep its main flow clear and 
lively.’16 This is, for me, a denial of the author’s responsibility to represent or constellate 
the fragments, the texts and sources he uses, in order to show the reader the 
significance of his argument. In this way Jenkins fails to present the reader with a 
complete artifact and asks the reader to do the hard work alone, cross-referring from 
main text to endnotes in order to piece the argument together.  
Jenkins employs this method to consider Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’ in an endnote 
to chapter 6, his most extensive consideration of Benjamin’s work anywhere in the book. 
This three page endnote (at pages 145-148) notes Benjamin’s distinction between ‘law-
preserving violence’, ‘law-creating violence’, and ‘divine violence’. In the main text 
Jenkins notes that the endnote ‘briefly argues the relevance of “divine violence” to the 
present study’.17 This amounts to a request to the reader to dart around the study, 
piecing together its fragments. This fragmented method leads to a failure of 
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representation. Asking the reader, in Benjaminian fashion, to be an ‘onlooker’, an active 
participant in the text, does not remove the author’s obligation to (re)present ‘situations’ 
or arguments ‘compellingly’ to the reader.18  
Jenkins’ fragmented method is most clearly presented in chapter 6. He explains that the 
first section of that chapter ‘implicitly relies on the analytical force of what I have been 
calling Benjaminian materialism (described in Chapter 1 as the basis of this study’s 
methodology)’.19 He goes on to explain that ‘this study’s critique of Last Will finds ample 
support in Agamben and Benjamin’.20 The connections which form the mosaic, the 
artifact, are never presented to the reader. The mosaic, the artifact, is only referred to 
but referring and showing are not the same thing. Jenkins’ language here is significant. 
He notes that ‘Benjaminian materialism’ was ‘described in Chapter 1 as the basis of this 
study’s methodology’, rather than asserting that Benjaminian materialism is the study’s 
methodology. There is no explanation or representation of what this methodology 
involves or how it differs from other, perhaps more orthodox legal methodologies. A truly 
Benjaminian materialism, as I will represent in what follows, depends on representation, 
on showing the reader the connections between the fragments selected by the author.  
Jenkins ‘inter-chapter theory signpost[s]’ can be contrasted with Benjamin’s ‘epistemo-
critical prologue’ to The Origin of German Tragic Drama.21 In his prologue Benjamin sets 
out the method he employs in his study. For Benjamin it is not possible to know what 
German tragic drama is, but it is possible to represent German tragic drama.22 This 
distinction between something that can be known, that can be captured or ‘possessed’,23 
and something which can be represented, is represented in the ‘idea’. The ‘idea’ of 
German tragic drama can be represented but it cannot be known.24 The purpose of such 
representation is ‘not to carry the reader away and inspire him with enthusiasm’, for 
‘contemplative…representation…can be counted successful only when it forces the 
reader to pause and reflect.’25  
Benjamin is, by the method of his own scholarship, offering methodological advice to 
those who would have their readership ‘pause and reflect’ on the orthodoxies of 
established intellectual fields or practices. If your aim is to advance an alternative 
representation of an existing ‘idea’, if you would have your readership question their 
preconceptions, it is essential that you map out the method of your argument – hence 
Benjamin’s ‘epistemo-critical prologue’. Without a clear representation of your method 
the extent to which your study operates as a challenge not only to established 
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understandings of a particular field of intellectual activity but also to the ways in which 
those understandings are produced is unlikely to be perceived by the reader.  
It is only by inviting the reader into the text as an ‘onlooker’, a co-author, working 
alongside you, the author, as you grapple with, assemble, constellate, and move through 
the material, the fragments, that the method and its alterity can be conveyed and 
demonstrated. By demonstrating the alterity of your method, and by performing that 
method in and through your text, with the reader as co-author, you are empowering the 
reader to assemble and constellate her own fragments as part of her own representation 
and, in doing so, you are deconstructing the (perceived) divide between author and 
reader.26 You, as author, are offering a complete artifact to the reader, inviting the reader 
into that artifact in order to understand how it has been assembled, thereby empowering 
the reader to assemble her own artifacts and, if she wishes, disassemble yours. 
Something of this trinity of representation, collaboration, and critique is captured in 
Benjamin’s observation that ‘the more significant works, inasmuch as they are not the 
original and, so to speak, ideal embodiments of the genre…fall outside the limits of 
genre. A major work will either establish the genre of abolish it; and the perfect work will 
do both.’27  
Benjamin’s Origin is not simply an argument for an alternative understanding of the 
nature of German tragic drama but, much more importantly, a representation of an 
alternative mode of scholarship which rejects the idea that things are simply to be known 
or understood.28 It presents a mode of scholarship which represents fields of intellectual 
inquiry and practice as ‘ideas’ to be represented and re-represented through the 
constellation of fragments;29 texts, phenomena,30 ‘the rags, the refuse’,31 those things in 
the world that are excluded from established understandings or orthodoxies.32  
Jenkins’ structure and method are not, in my view, and in the terms outlined above, 
Benjaminian. The separation of substance and theoretical support into chapter and inter-
chapter sections prevents the reader from immersing herself, as an ‘onlooker’, in the 
method of the argument; it does not empower the reader to engage in scholarship which 
challenges the conventional separation between law and the humanities because it does 
not present the reader with a coherent artifact which explicates its own method of 
challenging that separation. When Jenkins notes, in the epilogue, that ‘this study 
aims…to demonstrate a contribution at the inter-discipline of law-and-humanities’ he 
has,33 at least from the point of view of demonstrating a method by which law and 
humanities concepts and ideas can be fused, failed. Something of that failure is 
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conveyed in the fact that he claims only to have ‘demonstrate[d] a contribution’ and is, 
apparently, unable to show or represent to the reader the impact or nature of that 
contribution.  
To make a meaningful contribution to this ‘inter-discipline’ a text which represents and 
enacts the transformation which this inter-discipline seeks to bring about in law and legal 
thinking is called for. To write such a text – and this would seem to have been Jenkins’ 
ambition given his dual focus on inheritance law and ‘the inter-discipline of law-and-
humanities’ – a clear statement of methodology, an enactment of that methodology, and 
a representation of the ways in which that methodology differs from those conventionally 
employed by the discipline under scrutiny is required. That would be a truly 
transformatory contribution to the ‘inter-discipline of law-and-humanities’. Benjamin 
offers a template for authors of such transformatory texts in his Origin, but Jenkins does 
not adopt that template and, in my view, the book is the poorer for it. Had Jenkins 
provided a methodological introduction, his own version of the ‘epistemo-critical 
prologue’, the implications of his ‘contribution’ to the relationship between law and the 
humanities would, I suspect, have been more clearly represented. As it stands, the text 
amounts to a general argument for the exploration of legal concepts and structures, such 
as the last will, through literary texts, yet something much more significant and 
compelling was promised and possible.  
This is all the more regrettable given the promising ‘flash’ of light in one fragment of text 
towards the end of the book.34 Jenkins notes that ‘theater is a particularly potent medium 
for the undercutting of divine right claims, since both the actor and the one who claims 
divine right must be concerned with projecting an appearance.’35 Still focussing on 
‘divine right’, he goes on to note a connection between Shakespeare’s plays and 
‘Benjamin’s claims that baroque theatre tends to perform the “dysfunction” of 
sovereignty, rather than a transfer from one functioning sovereignty to another’.36  
Focussing on Shakespeare’s Tempest, Jenkins notes that:  
 
Prospero…aspires to pass down a law of “weak masters”…a law made by “elves” 
and those who leave no footprints…This would be a law that forces nothing on 
those who receive it. It would be more like a poem presented for followers 
consideration than a Last Will enforced.37  
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This idea of a law ‘more like a poem presented for followers consideration than a Last 
Will enforced’, a law of representation and performance rather than control and 
enforcement, is potentially hugely significant and original. Moreover, this 
representational form of law, as an ontology of law, a way in which law exists, and a 
method of legal practice, can be grounded in and developed through Benjamin’s work.38 
In Origin, as discussed above, Benjamin contrasts tragedy and trauerspiel. The former 
presents something complete, controlling and final to an audience, in much the same 
way that conventional understandings of a court’s judgment present that judgment as a 
complete achievement which deals with the case.39 The latter, trauerspiel, does not offer 
this kind of closure or resolution, as Benjamin makes clear in a passage which fuses the 
theatrical with the legal:  
 
The language of the pre-Shakespearian Trauerspiel has been aptly described as a 
‘bloody legal dialogue’…The legal analogy may reasonably be taken further and, in 
the sense of the mediaeval literature of litigation, one may speak of the trial as the 
creature whose charge against death – or whoever else was indicted in it – is only 
partially dealt with and is adjourned at the end of the Trauerspiel.40  
 
Jenkins does not, however, develop this poetic, artistic concept of law, leaving the 
reader with only the fragment of the passage quoted above.  
This book’s fragmented method, for all that it points and hints at the possibility of a 
Benjaminian approach to law and legal scholarship, leaves the reader with fragments. It 
fails to constellate those fragments to produce an artifact, a representation, or, the 
greatest prize, a ‘dialectical image’. In that sense I agree with Jenkins that he has 
‘demonstrate[d] a contribution at the inter-discipline of law-and-humanities’, but it is an 
incomplete, fragmentary, fragmented contribution. For me, the message of Benjamin’s 
scholarship is that out of fragments the author constructs artifacts or representations as 
‘the master of the ars inveniendi…a [wo]man who could manipulate models with 
sovereign skill’.41 The impact of that message on legal scholarship is still to be realised.  
 
                                                          
1  University of Southampton, School of Law, Centre for Law, Ethics and Globalisation. The ideas 
concerning the method of Benjaminian legal thought and scholarship in this article are based on my PhD 
thesis. I am currently working on a book version of that thesis. I am grateful to Dr. Ralph Wilde and 
Professor Catherine Redgwell for their support as supervisors and to UCL’s Graduate School for financial 
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support. I am grateful to Dr. David Gurnham (Southampton) for reading and commenting on a draft of 
this piece.  
 
2  Consider the following, non-exhaustive, selection of recent scholarship as an illustration of the extent of 
scholarship on Benjamin and law: Panu Minkkinen, ‘”Here I stand, I can do no other: Politics, Violence, and Ends in 
Themselves’ 25 Law and Literature 226 (2013); Andrew Benjamin, ‘Morality, Law and the Place of Critique: Walter 
Benjamin’s The Meaning of Time in the Moral World’ 12(3) Critical Horizons 281 (2011); Ariella Azoulay, ‘The Loss of 
Critique and the Critique of Violence’ 26 Cardozo Law Review 1005 (2006); Joseph Jenkins, ‘Heavy Law / Light Law: 
Walter Benjamin, Friedrich Nietzsche, Robert Bork, Duncan Kennedy’  17 Law and Literature 249 (2005); Benjamin 
Morgan, ‘Undoing Legal Violence: Walter Benjamin’s and Giorgio Agamben’s Aesthetics of Pure Means’ 34(1) Law 
and Society 46 (2007); Matthew Abbott, ‘The Creature Before the Law: Notes on Walter Benjamin’s Critique of 
Violence’ 16 Colloquy 80 (2008); Marc de Wilde, ‘Meeting Opposites: The Political Theologies of Walter Benjamin and 
Carl Schmitt’ 44(4) Philosophy and Rhetoric (2011) 363 
 
3 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin tr., (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 462 (N2a,3): ‘It’s not that what is past casts its light on 
what is present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes 
together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while 
the relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-has-been to the 
now is dialectical: is not progression, but image, suddenly emergent. – Only dialectical images are genuine images 
(that is, not archaic); and the place where one encounters them is language. Awakening.’; On Benjamin’s concept of 
the dialectical image see Max Pensky, ‘Method and Time: Benjamin’s dialectical images’ in David S. Ferris ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 177.  
 
4
 The concept of the ‘constellation’ is central to Walter Benjamin’s ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne, (London, New York: Verso, 1998) – see 34: ‘Ideas are to objects as 
constellations are to stars…They do not contribute to the knowledge of phenomena, and in no way can the latter be 
criteria with which to judge the existence of ideas.’ See also Theodor Adorno, ‘Notes on Philosophical Thinking’ in 
Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords (Henry W. Pickford tr., Columbia University Press, 
2005) 127, 131, apparently expanding on Benjamin’s concept: ‘Truth is a constantly evolving constellation, not 
something running continuously and automatically in which the subject’s role would be rendered not only easier but, 
indeed, dispensable. The fact that no philosophical thinking of quality allows of concise summary, that it does not 
accept the usual scientific distinction between process and result…renders this experience palpably clear’  
footnotes omitted. On the concept of the fragment see the quotation from Benjamin in note 7 below.  
 
5 Joseph S. Jenkins, Inheritance Law and Political Theology in Shakespeare and Milton: Election and Grace as 
Constitutional in Early Modern Literature and Beyond (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).  
 
6 Jenkins, ibid. refers to ‘Benjaminian Materialism at 4, ‘Benjaminian historical materialism’ at 6 (it is not clear 
whether this is a distinct concept from ‘Benjaminian Materialism’), and refers to Benjamin at numerous other points 
throughout the text. Most significantly, at 31, Jenkins refers to ‘Benjaminian materialism’ as ‘this study’s primary 
methodology’ (the original text at 31 is in italics).  
 
7 Benjamin, Origin, supra note 4 above, 28-9: ‘Just as mosaics preserve their majesty despite their 
fragmentation into capricious particles, so philosophical contemplation is not lacking in momentum….The 
value of fragments of thought is all the greater the less direct their relationship to the underlying idea, 
and the brilliance of the representation depends as much on this value as the brilliance of the mosaic 
does on the quality of the glass paste. The relationship between the minute precision of the work and the 
proportions of the sculptural or intellectual whole demonstrates that truth-content is only to be grasped 
through immersion in the most minute details of subject-matter.’ And see 119: ‘As is suggested by the 
open theatre and the fact that the performance is never repeated identically, what takes place is a 
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decisive cosmic achievement. The community is assembled to witness and to judge this achievement. The 
spectator of tragedy is summoned, and is justified, by the tragedy itself; the Trauerspiel, in contrast, has 
to be understood from the point of view of the onlooker. He learns how, on the stage, a space which 
belongs to an inner world of feeling and bears no relationship to the cosmos, situations are compellingly 
presented to him.’  
 
8 Walter Benjamin, ‘One-way Street’ in Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings eds., Walter Benjamin: Selected 
Writings: Volume 1, 1913-1926 (Cambridge Massachusetts, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2004) 444, 449: ‘children are particularly fond of haunting any site where things are being visibly worked on…In 
waste products they recognize the fact that the world of things turns directly and solely to them. In using these 
things, they do not so much imitate the works of adults as bring together, in the artifact produced in play, materials 
of widely differing kinds in a new, intuitive relationship’ – emphasis added; Theodor W. Adorno, Gretel Adorno and 
Rolf Tiedemann eds., Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, (London, New York: Continuum, 2004), 236 
connects ‘artifact’ with ‘artwork’: ‘The concept of an artifact, from which “artwork” is etymologically derived, does 
not fully comprise what an artwork is…In art the difference between the thing made and its genesis – the making – is 
emphatic: Artworks are something made that has become more than something simply made.’ 
 
9 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Author as Producer’ in Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith eds., Walter 
Benjamin: Selected Writings: Volume 2, 1927-1934, trans. Rodney Livingstone, (Cambridge Massachusetts, London:  
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 768. 
 
10 Benjamin, Arcades, supra note 3, 460 (N1a,8): ‘Method of this project: literary montage. I needn’t say 
anything. Merely show. I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags, 
the refuse – these I will not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their own: by 
making use of them’, emphasis in original, and 473 (N9,8): ‘Being a dialectician means having the wind of 
history in one’s sails. The sails are the concepts. It is not enough, however, to have sails at one’s disposal. 
What is decisive is knowing the art of setting them.’   
 
11 See Benjamin, Origin, supra note 4 above, 29: ‘If representation is to stake its claims as the real 
methodology of the philosophical treatise, then it must be the representations of ideas. Truth, bodied 
forth in the dance of represented ideas, resists being projected, by whatever means, into the realm of 
knowledge’, and see 27: ‘It is characteristic of philosophical writing that it must continually confront the 
question of representation.’   
 
12 Jenkins, supra note 5, 1.  
 
13 Ibid. 201.  
 
14 Ibid. 19.  
 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Ibid.  
 
17 Ibid.  
 
18
 Benjamin, Origin, supra note 4, 119: ‘the Trauerspiel, in contrast, has to be understood from the point 
of view of the onlooker. He learns how, on the stage, a space which belongs to an inner world of feeling 
and bears no relationship to the cosmos, situations are compellingly presented to him.’  
 
19 Jenkins, supra note 5, 140.  
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20 Ibid.  
 
21 Benjamin, Origin, supra note 4, 27.  
 
22 Ibid. 28: ‘If philosophy is to remain true to the law of its own form, as the representation of truth and 
not as a guide to the acquisition of knowledge, then the exercise of this form – rather than its 
anticipation in the system – must be accorded due importance.’  
 
23 Ibid. 29: ’Knowledge is possession. Its very object is determined by the fact that it must be taken 
possession of – even if in a transcendental sense – in the consciousness…For the thing possessed, 
representation is secondary; it does not have prior existence as something representing itself.’   
 
24 Ibid. 38: ‘In the sense in which it is treated in the philosophy of art the Trauerspiel is an idea’ and see 
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